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Biased Contribution Index: A Simpler Mechanism
to Maintain Fairness in Peer to Peer Network
Sateesh Kumar Awasthi and Yatindra Nath Singh, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—To maintain fairness, in the terms of resources
shared by an individual peer, a proper incentive policy is
required in a peer to peer network. This letter proposes, a
simpler mechanism to rank the peers based on their resource
contributions to the network. This mechanism will suppress the
free riders from downloading the resources from the network.
Contributions of the peers are biased in such a way that it can
balance the download and upload amount of resources at each
peer. This mechanism can be implemented in a distributed system
and it converges much faster than the other existing approaches.
Index Terms—Non-negative matrix, Eigenvector, Free Rider.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE peers are motivated to share the resources in a peerto peer network, if they get at least the amount of data,
what they have uploaded to the network. Most ideal situation
is that, when upload and download amount for each peer is
same. We call this, a fair situation in a peer to peer network. Of
course, there will be no free riders in this situation. Therefore
some mechanism is required to assure this. In this letter, we
are proposing a simple mechanism called biased contribution
index(BCI).
To achieve the aforementioned state, many incentive mech-
anisms have been studied [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Among these,
global approaches [3], [4] performed better compared to local
approaches [5], [6], [7]. In global approaches, shared history
of peers in entire network is taken into consideration. It
gives the wider view of peer’s cooperation in the network.
However, global approaches are not trivial to implement in
the network. Like in [4], each peer needs to keep the record
of every transaction history, regardless of whether he was
directly involved in them or not. In [3], peer’s contribution
largely depends upon the contribution of peer with whom it is
transacting so each peer needs to make some rough estimate
of the impact on its contribution before each transaction. Our
approach is similar to [3], but equal importance is given to
the actual contribution of peer and the contribution of peer
with whom it is transacting. It is simpler to implement in
the network due to its faster convergence. With the suitable
numerical example we compared the convergence result of our
approach with [3]. We found that our approach performs far
better in all the cases.
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the network model and introduction of biased contribution
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index. Solution of biased contribution index is given in section
III. Analysis of proposed algorithm is discussed in section
IV. Section V shows the numerical results, and in section VI,
conclusion is presented.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND BIASED CONTRIBUTION INDEX
Let there be N peers in a peer to peer network. Peers
share their resources with each other and their contribution
is calculated globally. A simple metric which can best reflect
the contribution of the peers in the network, could be the ratio
of its total upload to the network to the total download from
the network. But to motivate the peers to upload more to the
peers contributing more and to download more from the peers
contributing less, we need to bias this ratio by some incentive
factor. Let this incentive factor be, xi, for peer i. For peer i,
we define, the upload to download ratio(biased ratio)as
Ri =
ei.s.x
ei.sT.x
.
Here, s is NXN share matrix. Its ijth element represents
the amount of resource shared by peer i to peer j. ei is the row
vector with its ith entry as ’1’ and all other entries as zero.
The x is a vector containing incentive factors. Let us define
the incentive factor as a monotonically increasing function of
biased ratio, i.e.
xi =
Ri
1 +Ri
,
=
ei.s.x
ei.s.x+ ei.sT.x
.
We call this incentive factor as biased contribution index
(BCI).
Now to start the process of sharing we need to give some
initial value of BCI to all the peers. Let us define a parameter
α ∈ (0, 1) to decide the initial value of BCI. Later we
will see that the parameter α is also related to the speed
of convergence. The biased contribution index is modified to
include this parameter α, and is given by.
xi =
{
α ei.s.x
ei.s.x+ei.sT.x
+ (1 − α), if ei.s.x+ ei.sT.x 6= 0.
(1− α/2), otherwise.
(1)
Here, (1−α/2) is the initial value of biased contribution index,
when neither upload nor download has happened at the node.
In the network of N nodes, there will be N unknowns and
N nonlinear equations. We will see in the next section that,
these equations can be solved by a suitable iterative function.
Peers are allowed to take the resources from network only
if their biased contribution index is above a certain threshold
2value. Therefore every peer will try to increase its biased
contribution index, so that it can get the required amount of
resources whenever needed.
It can be observed easily from equation 1 that a peer’s biased
contribution index will be higher if
1). Its contribution sij is higher,
2). It shares more of its resources with higher contributing
peer, and
3). It takes more of the services from lower contributing peer.
Therefore, intuitively we can say that this metric can assure
fairness in the whole network. Later in section IV, we will
give a mathematical justification for this.
III. SOLUTION OF BIASED CONTRIBUTION INDEX
The BCI of any peer is expressed in the terms of the BCI
of other peers. If ei.s.x+ ei.sT.x 6= 0, for i = 1, 2....N , then
for N peers network, the equation 1, can be expressed in the
form of matrix.
x = diag[d1, d2, ...dN ].s.x+ (1− α)e
Here di = α/(ei.s.x+ ei.sT.x) and e is vector with each
element as ’1’. We propose following Lemmas in this regard.
Lemma 1. The biased contribution index vector x ∈ [(1 −
α), 1]N
Proof. When any peer i only takes the resources from the
network and does not contribute any thing, then ei.s.x = 0
and ei.sT.x 6= 0. In this case, biased contribution index of
peer i will be minimum and it will be,
xi = α.0 + (1− α) = (1− α).
When a peer i only contribute the resources to the network
without taking any thing, then ei.s.x 6= 0 and ei.sT.x = 0. In
this case, biased contribution index of peer i will be maximum
and it will be,
xi = α.1 + (1− α) = 1.
In all other cases it will be in between these values. Hence
x ∈ [(1− α), 1]N .
Lemma 2. Let s be NXN non negative, irreducible matrix,
then x in the above expression can be calculated by the
iterative function
xk = φ(xk−1),
where ith element of iterative function φ(xk−1) is
α[ei.s.x
k−1/(ei.s.x
k−1 + ei.s
T.xk−1)] + (1 − α).
Proof. The ith element of iterative function φ(xk−1) is
xki = α
ei.s.x
k−1
(ei.s.xk−1 + ei.sT.xk−1)
+ (1− α).
Let xki and xk−1i are, far from actual solution xi by δxki and
δxk−1i respectively, then
xi+δx
k
i = α
ei.s.(x+ δx
k−1)
[ei.s.(x+ δxk−1) + ei.sT.(x+ δxk−1)]
+(1−α).
Let s+ sT = s
′
, then
xi + δx
k
i = α
ei.s.(x+ δx
k−1)
ei.s
′ .(x+ δxk−1)
+ (1− α).
δxki = α
ei.s.(x+ δx
k−1)
ei.s
′ .(x+ δxk−1)
+ (1− α)− xi
Using equation 1,
δxki = α
ei.s.(x+ δx
k−1)
ei.s
′ .(x+ δxk−1)
− α
ei.s.x
ei.s
′ .x
.
δxki = α
ei.s.x
ei.s
′ .x
[ (
1 + ei.s.δx
k−1
ei.s.x
)
(
1 + ei.s
′
.δxk−1
ei.s
′
.x
) − 1
]
.
It can be observed from equation 1,
xi > α
ei.s.x
ei.s.x+ ei.sT.x
= α
ei.s.x
ei.s
′ .x
;
hence,
δxki < xi
[ (
1 + ei.s.δx
k−1
ei.s.x
)
(
1 + ei.s
′
.δxk−1
ei.s
′
.x
) − 1
]
=
xi(
1 + ei.s
′
.δxk−1
ei.s
′
.x
)
[(
1 +
ei.s.δx
k−1
ei.s.x
)
−
(
1 +
ei.s
′
.δxk−1
ei.s
′ .x
)]
=
xi(
1 + ei.s
′
.δxk−1
ei.s
′
.x
)
[(
ei.s
ei.s.x
)
−
(
ei.s
′
ei.s
′ .x
)]
δxk−1
=
1(
1 + ei.s
′
.δxk−1
ei.s
′
.x
)
[(
xiei.s
ei.s.x
)
−
(
xiei.s
′
ei.s
′ .x
)]
δxk−1
= fi(δx
k−1)[Ai −Bi]δx
k−1
Where Ai and Bi are ith row of NXN matrix A and B
respectively. It can be observed about matrix A and B that,
Ax = x and Bx = x.
Matrix A and B are derived from matrix s. Since matrix s
is irreducible hence matrix A and B will also be irreducible.
Elements of vector x are positive (see Lemma 1), so for non
negative matrix s, matrix A and B will also be non negative.
Therefore spectral radius of matrix A and B will be ’1’ and
corresponding eigen vector will be x (see [8]).
If δxk−1 << x, then fi(δxk−1) ≈ 1. Hence,
δxk < [A−B]δxk−1 < [A−B]kδx0
limk→∞δx
k < limk→∞[A−B]
kδx0 = 0
(see Theorem 1 in [1])
And if δxk−1 > x, then fi(δxk−1) < 1. Hence in this case,
δxk−1i will decrease more rapidly till δxk−1 << x.
Hence x can be calculated by the aforementioned iterative
function.
Lemma 3. If x = ae is the solution of biased contribution
index then a will be (1− α/2).
Proof. If ei.s.x+ ei.sT.x 6= 0, equation 1 can be written as
xi(ei.s.x+ ei.s
T.x) = αei.s.x+ (1 − α)(ei.s.x+ ei.s
T.x)
⇒ xi(ei.s.x+ ei.s
T.x) = ei.s.x+ (1 − α)ei.s
T.x
3for i = 1, 2, ...N . Hence, above relation can be written in the
form of matrix as follows.
diag(x)(s + sT)x = sx+ (1− α)sTx.
Here diag(x) is NXN diagonal matrix with its iith element
as xi. Now if x = ae then
aI(s + sT)ae = as.e+ (1 − α)asT.e
⇒ a2(s+ sT)e = a(s.e+ (1− α)sT.e)
Pre-multiply by eT on both side
a2eT(s + sT)e = a(eT.s.e+ (1− α)eT.sT.e)
⇒ a2(eT.s.e+ eT.sT.e) = a(eT.s.e+ (1− α)eT.sT.e)
for any matrix s, eT.s.e will be the sum of all of its elements.
Hence eT.s.e = eT.sT.e = T , and above expression can be
written as
a2(T + T ) = a(T + (1 − α)T )
since a ∈ [(1− α), 1], hence
a(2T ) = (2− α)T
since T 6= 0, hence a = (1− α/2)
Lemma 4. If x = (1 − α/2)e is the solution of biased
contribution index then
(sT − s)eTi ⊥ e ∀i.
Proof. Substituting x = (1− α/2)e in equation 1
(1− α/2) = α
(1− α/2)ei.s.e
(1− α/2)(ei.s.e+ ei.sT.e)
+ (1− α)
⇒ α/2 = α
ei.s.e
(ei.s.e+ ei.sT.e)
⇒ α(ei.s.e+ ei.s
T.e) = 2αei.s.e
⇒ αei(s− s
T).e = 0
⇒ α((sT − s)eTi )
T.e = 0
Since α 6= 0, hence
(sT − s)eT
i
⊥ e ∀i
Lemma 5. If se = sTe, then the biased contribution index
vector, x = (1− α/2)e.
Proof. se = sTe⇒ eTsT = eTs, now from equation 1, if
ei.s.x+ ei.s
T.x 6= 0.
diag(x)(s + sT)x = sx+ (1− α)sTx
Pre-multiply by eT on both side
eTdiag(x)(s + sT)x = eTsx+ (1− α)eTsTx
⇒ xT(s+ sT)x = eTsx− (α/2)eTsTx+ (1− α/2)eTsTx
⇒ xT(s+ sT)x = eTsx− (α/2)eTsx+ (1− α/2)eTsTx
⇒ xT(s+ sT)x = (1− α/2)eTsx+ (1−α/2)eTsTx
⇒ xT(s+ sT)x = (1− α/2)eT(s+ sT)x
⇒ [xT−(1−α/2)eT](s+ sT)x = 0
It is clear that (s+ sT) is non negative matrix and x > 0
hence (s + sT)x 6= 0. Hence x = (1− α/2)e.
IV. ANALYSIS OF BIASED CONTRIBUTION INDEX
A. Solution Of Free Riding and Collusion
Initially every peer is allowed to take some resources from
the network; otherwise process of sharing will not start. Hence,
initial BCI of (1−α/2) for each peer is justified. But as soon
as BCI is updated, free rider’s BCI will reach at minimum
level. Because for any free rider i, ei.s.x = 0, hence from
equation 1, xi = (1 − α). This will disqualify them from
taking any resources from the network in future, until they
acquire sufficient BCI.
The contributing peer will always gain the BCI and resource
taking peer will always loose the BCI. Hence, peers will
always avoid reporting the false transaction and thus, collusion
can be avoided in the network.
B. Justification For Fairness
We can observe the following from the above discussion.
1) If the biased contribution index of all peers are same, then
the amount of resources contributed will be same as what is
taken from the network for each peer.
2) If resources contributed and resources taken from the
network in each peer are same, then the biased contribution
index of all peers will be same.
First point is evident from section III. That is, if biased
contribution index of all peers are same then it will be (1 −
α/2) (see Lemma 3). And if biased contribution index will be
(1 − α/2) then (sT − s)eT
i
⊥ e for all i (from Lemma 4).
Hence
ei.(s− s
T).e = 0 ∀i
⇒ ei.s.e = ei.s
T.e ∀i
Hence total amount of resources contributed and taken from
the network by each peer will be same.
Second point can be understood directly from Lemma 5. If
resources contributed and taken from the network in each peer
are same then
ei.s.e = ei.s
T.e ∀i
Hence se = sTe and x = (1 − α/2)e. Hence biased contri-
bution index of all peers will be same.
C. Implementation In Distributed System
Calculation of biased contribution index can be imple-
mented in a distributed system following the same approach as
in [1] [2] [3]. Multiple other peers named index managers, can
be assigned to maintain the record of biased contribution index
of any peer. Whenever any peer needs the biased contribution
index, of other peers it can send the query to the respective
index managers. If there is any conflict about the biased contri-
bution index of a peer, it can be settled, by majority of voting
4Table I: Biased Global Contribution index for, α = 0.8 in each
iteration
i 1 2 3 4
x
0 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000
x
1 0.7440 0.5000 0.5333 0.6174
x
2 0.7266 0.4823 0.5161 0.6373
x
3 0.7202 0.4861 0.5170 0.6379
x
4 0.7207 0.4870 0.5177 0.6371
x
5 0.7210 0.4869 0.5177 0.6370
x
6 0.7210 0.4868 0.5177 0.6370
x
7 0.7210 0.4868 0.5177 0.6370
Table II: Biased Global Contribution index for, α = 0.4 in
each iteration
i 1 2 3 4
x
0 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
x
1 0.8720 0.7500 0.7667 0.8087
x
2 0.8690 0.7465 0.7634 0.8124
x
3 0.8685 0.7468 0.7634 0.8124
x
4 0.8686 0.7468 0.7635 0.8124
x
5 0.8686 0.7468 0.7635 0.8124
by index managers. In this way we can avoid the collusion
among peers. For calculation of biased contribution index of
any peer, index manager needs to know the contribution and
resource taken by that peer and biased contribution index of
peer with whom it is transacting. Calculation is repeated till
the convergence of biased contribution index is achieved. If
number of iterations required to converge the algorithm are
less, then required number of update messages will also be
less. Therefore the algorithm can be implemented with less
overhead. In next section, we will compare the speed of
convergence of our method with the other algorithm [3].
V. NUMERICAL RESULT
We considered the share matrix s as

0 100 50 20
20 0 30 40
10 40 0 50
50 10 60 0

 .
A. Speed of Convergence
The number of iterations required for convergence of the
biased contribution index were estimated for two different
values of α. For α = 0.8, BCI in each step is shown in Table
I. We can see that it converges in seven iterations. For α = 0.4
(see Table II), it converge only in five iterations. Thus impact
of α is clearly evident in the results.
B. Comparison of Convergence Speed With GC[3]
We compared the number of iterations required for conver-
gence of the biased contribution index and global contribution
[3]. In latter case, we have taken the different values of α and
β as defined in [3]. Results are shown in Table III. We can
observe that the number of iterations required for convergence
of BCI is always lesser than the global contribution mentioned
in [3].
Table III: Number of iterations, required to converge the BCI
and GC [3] for different values of α and β(parameter β is
defined as in [3])
Number of iteration required
in GC[3]
Number of iteration
required in BCI
β = 0.8, Iterations = 9
α = 0.9 β = 0.5, Iterations = 10 Iterations = 8
β = 0.2, Iterations = 10
β = 0.8, Iterations = 10
α = 0.8 β = 0.5, Iterations = 8 Iterations = 7
β = 0.2, Iterations = 11
β = 0.8, Iterations = 9
α = 0.7 β = 0.5, Iterations = 8 Iterations = 7
β = 0.2, Iterations = 9
β = 0.8, Iterations = 8
α = 0.6 β = 0.5, Iterations = 7 Iterations = 6
β = 0.2, Iterations = 8
β = 0.8, Iterations = 7
α = 0.5 β = 0.5, Iterations = 6 Iterations = 5
β = 0.2, Iterations = 8
β = 0.8, Iterations = 7
α = 0.4 β = 0.5, Iterations = 6 Iterations = 5
β = 0.2, Iterations = 7
β = 0.8, Iterations = 6
α = 0.3 β = 0.5, Iterations = 5 Iterations = 4
β = 0.2, Iterations = 6
β = 0.8, Iterations = 5
α = 0.2 β = 0.5, Iterations = 5 Iterations = 3
β = 0.2, Iterations = 6
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a new metric, the biased con-
tribution index, to evaluate the contributions of the peers in
the network. Using this metric we can discourage the free
riding in the network. We can also ensure the balance between
the total upload and download by a node in the network. We
compared our method with another existing approach [3]. With
the help of numerical example, we have shown that our metric
converges in lesser number of iterations compared to the global
contribution approach given in [3]. Our approach can also be
implemented in a distributed system and is much simpler than
the other existing approach.
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